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1 Introduction
During a campaign rally in 2012, former Republican nominee and Massachusetts Governor Mitt
Romney attracted attention when he floated the idea that it should be a requirement for future
presidents to ”spend at least three years working in business before he could become president of
the United States.” With reference to his own tenure at investment firm Bain Capital, Romney
went on to claim that a president with private sector experience would better understand which
policies are necessary to stimulate business growth (The Washington Post, 2009). Four years
later, Donald Trump, a businessman who has never held a public office before, gets voted to
be the 45th President of the United States. Like Romney, he repeatedly praised his business
acumen during the electoral campaign. For instance, Trump said during the Second Republican
Debate in September 2015: ”What I am [...] is a businessman, and that’s the kind of mindset
this country needs to bring it back” (Time, 2015). In a speech in Charlotte, North Carolina he
added: ”As you know, I am not a politician. I have worked in business, creating jobs and re-
building neighborhoods my entire adult life” (The Washington Post, 2016). In this perspective,
it would be interesting to know whether these claims are only campaign promises or whether
businesspersons are actually more qualified to run a government, foster economic growth and
improve public finance.
Concerning this, one should start by asking whether is it reasonable to assume that personal
and biographic characteristics might matter for policy outcomes in the first place. Despite an
ongoing debate in the literature, a predominant portion of studies comes to the conclusion that
personal properties affect a legislator’s behaviour and his/her ability to govern. For instance,
Brollo and Troiano (2016) show that female mayors in Brazil are less likely to engage in cor-
ruption and hire fewer temporary public employees than male mayors. Moreover, in the case of
India, having a woman in the village council, influences both adolescent girls’ career aspirations
and educational attainment (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004) as well as the types of public
goods provided (Beaman et al., 2012). With respect to differences in education, Besley et al.
(2011) show that high educated political leaders generate higher economic growth. Additionally,
Alesina et al. (2015) state that also the politician’s age matters. In their study for Italian local
governments they show that due to stronger career concerns, younger politicians increase public
spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in pre-election years.
In view of this rich literature on gender, education and age, it is notable that the effect of a
candidate’s professional background has received relatively little attention so far. This is even
more surprising when considering that there are many examples for politicians like Romney and
Trump who explicitly promote their professional background to signal voters their competence
for office.1
With my paper, I want to contribute to investigate whether policy outcomes actually differ under
legislators with business experience. For this purpose, I examine data on 4,813 mayoral elections
in Brazilian municipalities during 2004, 2008 and 2012. In order to rule out any endogeneity
1Certainly, Trump and Romney were not the first candidates to make a run for a high political office with
experience in the business sector. For example, in Italy media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi was Prime Minister for
nine years and in Britain, a former boss of Standard Chartered bank became minister of trade while a former
adviser to the investment bank UBS Warburg got the position as competitiveness minister (The Economist,
2009).
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issues in the selection of the mayor, I use a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the
effect of business experience on public finance, public employment and corruption.
One of the main challenges in this paper is the exact definition of the business-group. Although
a businessperson is defined as someone with practical experience is the business sector, it re-
mains unclear to what extent this also requires an appropriate education in a business-related
subject or management skills that go beyond pure purchasing and selling processes. As an at-
tempt to deal with this issue, I conduct my analysis for three different business-groups. In my
baseline case, I aggregate all candidates with a business profession to one group called ”busi-
nesspersons”. Subsequently, I repeat my study for entrepreneurs and merchants, the two main
sub-groups within ”businesspersons”, separately. Even though all candidates in these two groups
have practical experience in the business sector, their areas of responsibility and working con-
ditions are very diverse. Regarding this, merchants are usually specialised in trade and selling
goods while entrepreneurs are defined as persons who organize and manage a business, usually
with considerable initiative and risk.
The empirical results from the baseline estimation turn out to be mostly insignificant and non-
robust. This supports my assumption that the relatively broad definition of a businessperson
does not account for heterogeneity within the business-group. Repeating the analysis for en-
trepreneurs and merchants eventually confirms the presumption that the estimated treatment
effect in the baseline case is inaccurate. From the first sub-sample I obtain robust evidence that
electing an entrepreneur leads to 7-10% higher total revenue, 8-10% higher total expenditure,
7-12% higher current transfers and between three and five additional active direct administra-
tion employees per 1,000 inhabitants. On the contrary, electing a merchant does not affect any
of the outcome variables.
Overall, I find three main results. First, I reject the hypothesis that there is an effect of busi-
ness experience per se. Second, having only practical experience in trade does not affect policy
outcomes either. Third, the election of a relatively ”high level” businessperson with a relevant
management experience does significantly improve public finance. Thus, it can be assumed
that due to their advanced negotiating skills and their better understanding of economic inter-
relations, entrepreneurs attract more transfers from higher government levels. Therefore, the
municipality’s total revenue increases, which in turn leads to higher expenditure and the hiring
of more public servants.
The paper is structured as follows: In the Section 2, I give an overview over the existing literature
and explain why policy outcomes might differ when a businesspersons is in charge. In Section 3,
I describe the data I use and show how I prepared the dataset for my estimations. After that, I
present my empirical strategy in Section 4 and tests the validity of my regression discontinuity
design in the baseline case. Section 5 reports and discusses the results for businesspersons in
general, as well as for entrepreneurs and merchants. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In the contemporary political debate there appears to be a believe that some personal charac-
teristics qualify certain politicians better for office than others. For instance, it is assumed that
professional, social and age groups have different skill sets and heterogeneous personal prefer-
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ences. As a consequence, some politicians are expected to be more able to govern, implement
reforms or represent certain electoral groups.
Nevertheless, the existing literature has been divided on this topic. On the one side, the clas-
sical models of electoral competition, such as the Downsian model (Downs, 1957), suggest that
personal characteristics and preferences should not matter. Under these models, all candidates
will eventually support the policy preferred by the median voter in an attempt to maximize their
vote-shares. Aldrich and Rohde (2000) add that also a party’s political agenda or unforeseen
events such as natural catastrophes or terror attacks might take precedence over a politician’s
personal interest. Moreover, Matthews (1984) and Besley (2005) argue that during the time in
office the impact of institutional socialization might override past experiences.
However, as stated in the previous section, many studies do find evidence that politicians’ bio-
graphic and personal characteristics matter. Under the assumption that this is actually the case,
the election of a businessperson might impact policy in two ways. First, businesspeople could
have different preferences and thus, vote differently on issues specifically related to their pro-
fessional background. In theory, the ”citizen-candidate” models (Osborne and Slivinski (1996);
Besley and Coate (1997)) adopt this idea and assume that politicians only run for office if their
expected benefit from winning outweighs the costs of running. As these costs are expected to
to different for each politician, candidates will not approach and eventually implement the same
policy as in the before mentioned median voter models. Poole and Rosenthal (1996) show a
direct comparison between a ”principal-agent” model, where the legislator (agent) must serve
the interests of a voter (principal), and an ”ideological” approach that accounts for personal
preferences and ideology of the principal. Based on an empirical tests for the United States
Senate the authors reject the first theory and conclude that legislators take their voting deci-
sions due to a ”dash of the principal’s preferences, a sprinkle of party discipline, and a pinch
of the legislator’s personal ideology”. Witko and Friedman (2008) find that this is also true
for the concrete case of businesspersons. Their results suggest that Congress members with
business background have closer relationships with business interests and thus, they are both
more likely to receive larger contributions from corporate Political Action Committees (PACs)
and demonstrate more pro-business roll call voting.2
Second, as Beach and Jones (2016) point out, the probably most frequently named benefits
of electing a businessperson is his/her alleged better understanding of economic interrelations,
good negotiating skills and a higher ability to improve public finance.3 In fact, an AP-GfK Poll
from October 2016 found that Republican voters preferred private sector leadership experience
over experience holding elected office 76% to 22%. In contrast, only 33% of Democrats, saw
private sector experience as more important.
2Note, that this correlation between professional backgrounds and the way how politicians vote on certain issues
has been proven for a number of other groups. For example, Lupton (2017) shows that congresspersons with
military experience are significantly more likely to vote to increase congressional oversight over war operations,
Bellemare and Carnes (2015) conclude that politicians with farming experience tend to vote in favour of farm
subsidies and finally, lawyers vote differently on no-fault insurance (Dyer, 1976) and tort reforms (Matter and
Stutzer, 2015).
3Regarding a background in economics, Rajan (2004) state that ”the gains from reform[s] are never as clear to
the wider public as they are to economists”. Dreher et al. (2009) add that those politicians might also be more
likely to detect bad advice and ”resist the pressure of lobbying groups preferring the status quo”. Nevertheless,
one should keep in mind that there is a distinct difference between economics and business and thus, not every
businessperson might also have had an education in economics.
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However, other authors strongly oppose the idea that the quality or ability of a candidate might
vary due to business experience. For example, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman wrote in a Harvard
Business Review column:
”What people learn from running a business won’t help them formulate economic
policy. A country is not a big corporation. The habits of mind that make a great
business leader are not, in general, those that make a great economic analyst [...].”
(Krugman, 1996)
Another often repeated argument against an effect of business experience is that goals of running
a business vary greatly from those of running a country, state or municipality. In the private
sector, the main objective is always profit maximization. This is in stark contrast to the far
more complex goals for government success, which is measured in terms of prosperity, social
security and many other partially ”unmeasurable” things. (Forbes, 2016)
With respect to concrete empirical proof, Beach and Jones (2016) study California city councils
to check whether policy outcomes and public finance are different under politicians with business
experience. Using a regression discontinuity design they find no evidence that the election of a
business-candidate has an impact on city expenditure, revenues or the unemployment rate. In
addition, they check for effects that might be observable by the voter but not in the data. How-
ever, as future vote-shares for candidates with business experience are unaffected, the authors
also reject this hypothesis.
Overall, it can be said that the literature has been divided over the question whether business
knowledge has any impact on a politician’s later performance. Although some authors argue
that governing is not comparable to running a business, others suggest that policy outcomes
might vary due to personal preferences or business-specific skills, like leadership expertise and
a higher ability to deal with business-related issues such as public finance.
With this paper I want to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, to the best of my
knowledge, I am the first one ever to find a significant effect of business experience on public
finance and second, I am also the first one to analyse this effect on the municipality level in a
developing country.
3 Data on candidates, municipalities and federal units
The emphasis of this paper lies on mayoral elections in Brazilian municipalities during 2004,
2008 and 2012. Today, Brazil consists of 5,570 different municipalities in which the mayor gets
directly elected by citizens to a four-year mandate.4 For my empirical analysis of the alleged
effect of electing a candidate with business experience, I combine information from five different
sources.
First, I use electoral data from the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral), the
highest judicial body of the Brazilian Electoral Justice.5 From this source, I get two datasets.
The first one, Candidatos, provides detailed personal information for all candidates that ran
4Note, that the number of municipalities is slightly different in each period: 5,560 (2004); 5,564 (2008); 5,565
(2012). For more information see IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica.
5The dataset can be downloaded from the official website of the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
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in the mayoral elections. Regarding this, I obtain the profession (Descric¸a˜o da ocupac¸a˜o do
candidato), the civil status (Descric¸a˜o do estado civil do candidato) and the name of the mu-
nicipality where each candidate was born (Nome do munic´ıpio de nascimento do candidato).
The second dataset, Resultados, adds the total amount of votes that each candidate received
(Quantidade de votos nominais totalizados para aquele candidato naquele munic´ıpio e zona),
the electoral zone (Nu´mero da Zona Eleitoral) and the number of the electoral turn (Nu´mero
do turno).6
For financial data, I use the FINBRA dataset which is available on the website of the National
Treasury (Tesouro Nacional - Ministe´rio da Fazenda).7 This source contains the total popu-
lation (Populac¸a˜o) as well as a number of financial indicators that I use as potential outcome
variables. As the structure of these yearly databases changed in 2013, I only consider the years
between 2004 and 2012 for my study. For this period I obtain annual data about total revenue
(Receita total), total expenditure (Despesa Total), current transfers (Transfereˆncias correntes)
and the total dept-to-asset-ratio, which is computed as total liabilities (Passivo real) divided by
total assets (Ativo).8 Further, I follow an approach by Wang et al. (2007) and Rivenbark et al.
(2010) and define the ratio between revenues and expenditure as an additional measure for the
government’s financial condition.9 All financial variables are initially measured in Brazilian reais
(R$) but I will later re-define them in per capita terms and utilize logarithms for the regressions.
Third, I use the survey ”Brazilian Municipalities Profile” (Perfil dos Munic´ıpios Brasileiros),
which is conducted on a yearly basis by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica).10 From here, I get information about
the mayor’s age (Idade), gender (Sexo) and education (Escolaridade), as well as the municipali-
ties’ total active direct administration employees (Total de funciona´rios ativos da administrac¸a˜o
direta) and total active indirect administration employees (Total de funciona´rios ativos da ad-
ministrac¸a˜o indireta). Moreover, the IBGE data helps to answer whether or not the municipality
paid subsidies to firms in the last 24 months. I get information for five sectors: Industrial (In-
dustrial); commerce and services (Comercial e servic¸os); tourism, sport and leisure (Turismo,
esporte e lazer); agriculture (Agra´rio) and other sectors (Outros). Based on this, I include
dummy variables for all five sectors as well as another variable Subsidies which is the sum of
all five sector dummies.
Fourth, I use corruption data from audit reports that have been coded by Brollo et al. (2013).
In 2003, the Brazilian government started a federal anti-corruption program where they ran-
domly audited municipalities to develop an objective measure for administrative irregularities
in government contracts and purchases. For this purpose, Brollo et al. (2013) conduct a dummy
6Given this, I can calculate the total amount of votes per mayoral election as the sum of received votes over all
candidates and all electoral zones within each municipality. Eventually, a candidate’s vote-share is the number
of votes that he/she received divided by the total amount of votes given to all candidates in this municipality.
7The dataset can be downloaded from the official website of the Tesouro Nacional - Ministe´rio da Fazenda.
8The total liabilities are the sum of (1) financial liabilities (Passivo financeiro); (2) securities in circulation
(Obrigac¸o˜es em circulac¸a˜o); (3) outstanding short-term amounts (Valores pendentes de curto prazo - PNF ); (4)
long-term liabilities (Exig´ıvel a longo prazo) and (5) long-term results (Resultados de exerc´ıcios futuros).
9The ratio serves as an indicator for whether or not the government was able to stay within the budget and avoid
new debts. Note, that values above unity indicate that the mayor did not exceed the municipality’s budget.
10The dataset can be downloaded from the official website of the IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estat´ıstica.
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variable for broad corruption (Broad) corruption.11 Broad is equal to one if at least one of
the following irregularities has been detected: (1) illegal procurement practices; (2) fraud ; (3)
favoritism in the good receipt; (4) over-invoicing, occurring when there is evidence that pub-
lic goods or services are purchased for a value above the market price; (5) diversion of funds;
or (6) paid but not proven occurring when expenses are not proven.12 Overall, the federal
anti-corruption program allows to analyse corruption for 757 municipalities in the first period
(2004-2007). As the assignment to audit has been decided by lottery, some municipalities have
been audited twice during the period. In these cases, I take the average of the two observations.
Finally, I obtain data on the 27 Brazilian federal units (Unidades Federativas, UF ) from the
Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada (IPEA)).13
Here I focus on five measures: average household income in Brazilian reais (R$) per capita
(Renda domiciliar per capita - me´dia), the GINI coefficient (Renda - desigualdade - coeficiente
de Gini), the unemployment rate (Taxa de desemprego - (%)) and the average years of education
for people over 25 (Anos de estudo - me´dia - pessoas 25 anos e mais).
After combining all five sources, I apply three steps that are necessary to prepare the data for the
regression discontinuity analysis. First, I restrict the dataset to elections of mayors (Prefeito)
and elections on the municipality level (Eleic¸o˜es 2004, Eleic¸o˜es 2008, Eleic¸o˜es Municipal 2012 ).
Second, the Brazilian law distinguishes between two types of mayoral elections: in municipali-
ties with more than 200,000 voters the mayor gets elected by a majority run-off rule, while in
municipalities below 200,000 voters a plurality rule is applied. This implies that some elections
in large municipalities were decided in a second round if no candidate got more than 50% of the
total votes in the first round. In these cases, I drop the first round results and only consider
the second round where the two best candidates faced each other.14 Third, I take the average
of each variable over each legislative period and divide total revenue, total expenditure and cur-
rent transfers by the average total population in each period. In addition, I express all variables
related to public employment in terms of per 1,000 inhabitants.
Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview over all variables in the final dataset and Table
A2 shows which variables are available in each year. It might be important to state here that
not all variables are available for each municipality within each year and thus, the sample sizes
vary between outcome variables.
11The authors also derived a variable for and narrow corruption which is equal to one if at least one of the following
irregularities described in the audit reports is: (1) severe illegal procurement practices; (2) fraud ; (3) favoritism;
and (4) over-invoicing. However, every narrow corruption case is also included in the broad definition.
12Note, that (1) severe illegal procurement practices, occur when any of these issues are reported: (a) competition
has been limited, (b) manipulation of the bid value, (c) an irregular firm wins the bid process, (d) the minimum
number of bids is not attained, or (e) the required procurement procedure is not executed. For a more detailed
definition of the corruption measures see Brollo et al. (2013).
13Note, that I only use information about the 26 states within the 27 federal units (UF). For this reason, I will
continue to refer to states instead of UFs. The dataset can be downloaded from the official website of the
Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada (IPEA).
14However, in the final dataset I only have 16 out of 4,813 elections that were decided in the second round. For a
more detailed description of the electoral system in Brazil see Colomer (2016). Note, that Brollo and Troiano
(2016) also use the margin of victory for their analysis of the effect of electing a female mayor in Brazilian
municipalities.
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Figure 1: Candidates by profession
(a) Distribution all candidates’ professions
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(b) Distribution of the business-professions
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(a) I have assigned all professions that occur less than 1, 000 times in the dataset to Others. The full
dataset contains 255 different professions.
(b) The observations are distributed as follows: 4,077 merchants; 4,102 entrepreneurs; 124 managers;
77 business directors; 26 businessman and producers of public events.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Defining business-professions and descriptive statistics
As previously stated, the main goal of this paper is to examine whether policy outcomes differ
due to the mayor’s professional background. Figure 1a shows the distribution of occupations
over all candidates running in the three elections. It is worth mentioning that the profes-
sional backgrounds are very heterogeneous and range from car washer (Lavador De Ve´ıculos)
over gold miner (Garimpeiro) to senator (Senador). However, the biggest share of candidates
are entrepreneur (Empresa´rio), merchant (Comerciante) and mayor (Prefeito) with 9%, farmer
(Agricultor) with 8% or lawyer (Advogado) and doctor (Me´dico) with 6% of the total variety of
professions.
One crucial point for my analysis is to define which of these professions are business-related and
which ones are not. At first sight, this seems to be relatively straightforward as one could assume
that a businessperson is simply somebody who has working experience in the business-sector.
However, as I pointed out in Section 2, it is not only general management and negotiating
experience but also a better understanding of economic interrelations that allegedly qualifies a
businessperson better for office. In light of this, I repeat my analysis for three different definitions
of a business-profession. For my baseline study, I use a relatively broad definition and assign all
candidates to the business-group if they are either entrepreneur (Empresa´rio), merchant (Com-
erciante), business director (Diretor De Empresas), businessman and producer of public events
(Empresa´rio E Produtor De Espeta´culos Pu´blicos), or manager (Gerente). Figure 1b shows the
distribution of candidates within the baseline business-group. It is notable, that 97.3% of all
business-candidates are either entrepreneur (Empresa´rio) or merchant (Comerciante). As can-
didates from these two professional groups might be different, I complement my baseline study
with two additional analysis for these entrepreneurs and merchants in Section 5.2.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Municipalities where the mayor is a businessperson vs munici-
palities where the mayor has another professional background.
Variable Bit = 1 Obs. Bit = 0 Obs. ∆Bit p-Value
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mayor
Age 48.164 2,369 48.733 2,437 −0.569 0.041
Education 12.816 2,369 15.160 2,440 −2.344 0.000
Gender 0.052 2,369 0.102 2,440 −0.051 0.000
Married 0.801 2,372 0.778 2,441 0.023 0.054
Origin 0.435 2,372 0.415 2,441 0.020 0.168
Municipality and state
Population 23,730.94 2,320 24,071.10 2,396 −340.159 0.823
Income 865.748 2,372 859.675 2,441 6.074 0.451
GINI 0.516 2,372 0.517 2,441 −0.001 0.244
Unemployment 0.912 2,372 0.909 2,441 0.003 0.275
Av.Study 6.898 2,372 6.892 2,441 0.006 0.815
Public finance
Revenue 1,667.285 2,342 1,735.199 2,423 −67.914 0.053
Expenditure 1,641.23 2,342 1,698.144 2,423 −56.914 0.087
Transfers 1,525.191 2,342 1,571.269 2,423 −46.078 0.132
REratio 1.019 2,343 1.023 2,423 0.004 0.384
DAratio 0.493 2,343 0.506 2,423 −0.013 0.476
Subsidies to firms
Subsidies 1.684 1,257 1.712 1,329 −0.028 0.446
Public employment
StDirect 44.693 2,341 44.992 2,422 −0.299 0.575
StIndirect 1.764 571 1.851 602 −0.086 0.677
Corruption
Broad 0.881 118 0.904 104 −0.022 0.592
Note, that column (2) implies that the mayor is a businessperson and column (4) that the
mayor has a profession that I did not define as businessperson. Column (6) is the difference
between column (2) and (4): ∆Bit = (Bit = 1) − (Bit = 0). Column (2) and (4) report the
average values in the respective samples; Obs. is the number of observations; p-Value refers
to the statistical significance of (5); Standard errors are in parentheses. See Table A1 for the
definition of the variables.
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The aim of my baseline study is to analyse the effect of electing a mayor who had some kind
of business experience in his/her previous job in comparison to electing a mayor without this
kind of experience. For this purpose, I focus my analysis on elections where the two candidates
with the highest votes-shares were exactly one businessperson and one non-businessperson. Ig-
noring all other candidates from these elections as well as all other elections that do not fulfil
this criteria reduces the total number of candidates from 44,687 to 9,626.15 As the dataset still
includes two candidates per election, it is useful to drop all non-business-candidates and infer
that they won the two-candidates-races if the business-candidates lost. However, as I stated
in Section 3, mayors in municipalities with less than 200,000 voters get elected by a plurality
rule and thus, do not need more than 50% of the total votes to win. Hence, there is no clear
threshold value for the vote-share after which a candidate wins the election. One simple solution
for this problem is to define the margin of victory (MVit) as the difference between the business-
candidate’s vote-share and the one of the non-business-candidate. Now, I can conclude that the
business-candidate won the election if the margin of victory was non-negative (MVit ≥ 0) and
otherwise, the non-business-candidate became mayor. Eventually, my dataset consists of 4,813
elections of which the business-candidate could win 2,372 (49.28%).16
Table 1 shows a summary of the main variables according to the profession of the mayor. The
first two panels of the table show control variables for mayor (gender, age, education, civil
status, municipality of origin), municipality characteristics (total population in the year before
the election) and state characteristics (average household income per capita, GINI coefficient,
unemployment rate, average years of study for persons aged 25 or older).17 The third panel
includes variables related to public finance (total revenue, total expenditure, current transfers,
revenue-to-expenditure-ratio, debt-to-asset-ratio), the fourth includes a dummy for whether or
not the municipality government provided subsidies to firms, the fifth panel shows public em-
ployment (total direct and indirect administration employees), and the last one presents a broad
measure for corruption.
The dataset is divided into two sub-samples, in column (1) the mayor is a businessperson
(Bit = 1) and column (3) the mayor is a non-businessperson (Bit = 0). Column (5 and 6)
show the difference between column (1) and (3) and the according p-value.18
In the first panel, we see that 95% of all business-mayors are male (Genderit = 1 if the mayor is
female) and the average years of schooling of a businessperson is around 13 years, which equals
a completed high school degree (Ensino me´dio (2o grau) completo) and on average over two
years shorter than in the sub-sample of non-business mayors. As Figure 2 shows, the share of
high-educated mayors in the non-business group clearly exceeds the one of the business-group.
The reason for this is the large amount of academics (i.e. lawyers, doctors, teachers) and sci-
entists (i.e. pharmacists, engineers) in the first group. In addition, the share of women in the
non-business group is more than five percentage points higher. In both groups, the average
15Before that, I dropped 302 elections (0.68% of all elections) where I did not have information about public
finance, public employment nor subsidies.
16In the unrestricted sample (which includes all 44,687 candidates) businesspersons won 18.38% of the elections.
17In order to rule out the possibility of a direct influence of the mayor’s profession on the control variable (”bad
controls”), I need to use the lagged total population for the years 2003, 2007 and 2011. For the other variables
this is not necessary as they are not likely to be directly influenced by the treatment.
18Note, that Table 1 only shows the average effect over sub-populations rather than unit-level effects as it is not
possible to observe both Bit = 1 and Bit = 0 in the same period in one municipality.
9
4 Empirical Strategy Jannick Blaschke
Figure 2: Mayors’ years of education by profession
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The years of education belong to the following education levels: Primary education (incomplete 4.5;
complete 9), secondary education (incomplete 10.5; complete 12), higher education (incomplete 15;
complete 18) and post-graduation (22).
age of the mayor is 48 years, around 80% are married and approximately 42% of the mayors
govern in the same municipality where they were born. The average municipality population in
both samples is around 24,000. Further, the state characteristics seem to be balanced between
groups in terms of wealth (see Income and Unemployment), inequality (see GINI), as well as
education of the population (see Av.Study).
Although the findings from the first panel suggest that mayors differ according to their pro-
fession, none of the outcome variables in the last four panels seems to support this view. In
contrast, this early evidence from an average comparison indicates that electing a businessperson
does not have any effect on the municipality’s public finance, public employment, the likelihood
of providing subsidies to firms or corruption. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that
these results do not have a causal interpretation and are most likely biased as I will explain in
the following chapter.
4.2 Identification: Regression Discontinuity Design
The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that candidates with a background in business dif-
fer from non-business-candidates and thus, we should observe a different performance when
they become mayor. Let me define Yit(1) as a potential outcome variable for municipality i
during legislative period t ∈ {2004, 2008, 2012} if the mayor’s profession has been defined as
business-related. Alternatively, Yit(0) defines a potential outcome variable for municipality i
during legislative period t if the mayor’s profession has not been defined as business-related.
The coefficient of interest in my estimation will be the difference between these two potential
outcomes when the election has been a race between exactly one businessperson and one non-
businessperson, i.e. E(Yit(1) − Yit(0)|i ∈ Ω). The main concern is that I cannot observe both
cases simultaneously within one municipality at a given time. Further, a simple comparison be-
tween the average outcomes (as in Table 1) would fail to identify the true causal effect because
10
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the estimation might be biased due to endogeneity issues.19 For instance, the decision of electing
a businessperson might be correlated with municipality-specific characteristics such as previous
experience with businesspeople in politics or relative economic importance of the candidate’s
business.20 Hence, it will be necessary to find elections where on the one side both candidates
as well as municipality characteristics are similar but on the other side, the electoral outcome is
different.
One possible way to deal with these endogeneity issues is using a regression discontinuity design
(RDD). The RDD exploits precise knowledge of rules determining the assignment of a certain
treatment to identify its causal effect on the outcome of interest. Given that the rule is arbi-
trary and agents are not able to precisely sort across the selection threshold, the RDD provides
a randomized quasi-experiment to rule out selectivity and omitted variable bias in estimating
the treatment effect. Lee and Lemieux (2010) explain that the main idea behind this research
design is that individuals who score just below a certain cut-off (and thus, did not get the treat-
ment) and those just above the cut-off (who receive the treatment) are a good comparison. In
each RDD there is a so-called running variable, which is continuous around the threshold and
characterizes the assignment rule. If the treatment is a deterministic function of the running
variable, we are in the case of a sharp RDD. Otherwise, the RDD is fuzzy and there is only a
significant discontinuity in the probability of receiving the treatment conditional on the running
variable.
For this paper, I use the margin of victory (MVit) as the running variable and define zero as the
cut-off value after which the candidate gets the treatment of winning the election.21 Further, I
assume that an election where the businessperson receives a vote-share just below the threshold
provides a good counterfactual for another election where the businessperson gets just a few more
votes than his/her competitor and wins the election. In order to indicate the treatment status,
I define the dummy variable Bit which is equal to one if the business-candidate won the election
in municipality i at time t and zero otherwise. As the treatment is a deterministic function of
MVit, my approach can be categorized as a sharp RDD. Given the two potential outcomes, the
observed outcome can be expressed as Yit = Bit ∗ Yit(1) + (1 − Bit) ∗ Yit(0) and I define the
treatment group as those municipalities which voted for a mayor with business experience by a
narrow margin in an election where the two candidates with the highest vote-shares were one
businessperson and one non-businessperson. Assignment to treatment can be formalized as:
Bit = 1[MVit ≥ 0] (1)
19In other words, a comparison of means is only possible under the condition that all unobserved factors are
continuous in the whole sample. However, it is clear that this is usually not the case in reality.
20This could be the case when many voters are working for one large company and one of its managers runs for
mayor. Then, it would be likely that he/she understands the needs of both the industry and the employees better
than a business outsider. Another example comes from Beach and Jones (2016) who state that businesspeople
might be more likely to be elected in cities with economic distress as they are assumed to be better suited to
solve those issues.
21Recall that MVit = V oteShareit(Businessit = 1)−V oteShareit(Businessit = 0) where Businessit is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the candidate has a business-related profession and zero otherwise. Thus, the
candidate with the highest vote-share wins the election.
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In general, I can specify the following outcome equation for both sides of the threshold:
Yit = α+ f(MVit) + βBit + δXit + (Uit + eit) (2)
where f(·) is a function of the running-variable, Xit is a vector of control-variables, Uit is a vector
of unobservable factors that might ”directly” affect Yit and eit is the stochastic error term.
22
Subtracting the expected value of (2) for the control group from the expected value for the
treatment group, I can express the expected causal effect of the treatment around the cut-off as
follows:
E[Yit|MVit = c+ ∆]− E[Yit|MVit = c−∆] =
β + {E[δXit|MVit = c+ ∆]− E[δXit|MVit = c−∆]}
+{E[Uit + eit|MVit = c+ ∆]− E[Uit + eit|MVit = c−∆]}
(3)
where c is the cut-off value (here c = 0) and c ± ∆ defines a value just below or above the
threshold.
4.3 Validity of the regression discontinuity design
For a causal interpretation of the treatment effect (β) in equation (3), the RDD must satisfy
two main assumptions that allow me to neglect the last two terms on the equation’s right-hand
side. If both requirements are satisfied, I can interpret the difference in outcome variables as
the ”average treatment effect” (ATE) at the cut-off c and simplify equation (3) as follows:
βˆSRD = lim
∆→0
E[Yit|MVit = c+ ∆]− lim
∆→0
E[Yit|MVit = c−∆] = ATE (4)
where βˆSRD is the estimator for the sharp RDD.
23
The first condition, requires that the assignment around the threshold is exogenous. In other
words, if there is continuity in the joint distribution of the error term (Uit + eit) and MVit,
{E[Uit + eit|MVit = c+ ∆]−E[Uit + eit|MVit = c−∆]}, the last part in (3) becomes negligible.
The problem with this assumption is that I cannot test it directly. However, if I assume this
condition is violated, I must observe some sort of skewness or unusual jumps in the distribution
of the running-variable because candidates would be able to precisely manipulate their assign-
ment to the control or treatment group. Figure 3 shows a McCrary test (see McCrary (2008))
which treats the frequency counts of the running variable (MVit) as a dependent variable in
a local linear regression. As I do not observe any significant jumps around the threshold, I
can rule out that businesspeople can directly determine their electoral results and assume that
the variation in treatment close to the threshold is as good as random. In other words, every
business-candidate will approximately have the same probability of having a MVit that is just
below or just above c. A more analytical way to check this assumption is with placebo exper-
iments where I assign a different cut-off value c′ at which I should not observe any unusually
22Note, that it is possible that Bit and Uit are correlated.
23Note, that the ATE is defined as the mean effect of the treatment Bit averaging over all elections with a
particular set of observed characteristics (here MVit = c ± ∆). Moreover, the effect has to be regarded as a
(locally) weighted ATE because I give more weight to observations close to the threshold.
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Figure 3: McCrary test on the business-candidate’s margin of victory
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The variable on the x-axis indicates the margin of victory of the candidate with a business-related
profession. It is calculated as the difference between this business-candidate’s vote-share and non-
business-candidate’s vote-share. Thus, the businessperson won the election if his/her margin of victory
is bigger than zero. Otherwise, the non-businessperson won.
large jumps. In Table A3 in the Appendix I show regressions with two alternative thresholds
where c′ 6= 0.24 The coefficients are not statistically significant and thus, support the graphical
evidence from the McCrary test.
Second, as explained by Hahn et al. (2001), a causal interpretation of the RDD estimation
requires that the joint distribution of the vector of control-variables Xit and the running-
variable MVit is continuous and thus, also the part second part on the right-hand side in (3),
E[MVit = δXit|c+ ∆]− E[δXit|MVit = c−∆], can be ignored. An easy way to check this as-
sumption is to test if all covariates that might have a direct effect on the outcome, are the same
just below and above the threshold. Figure 4 presents scatterplots of the mean of mayoral,
municipality and state characteristics. The horizontal axis is the business-candidate’s margin of
victory and the observations are averaged within bins. As Table 1 has already predicted, there
is a major jump in the years of education and the gender of the mayor. All other covariates
seem to be balanced.
Nonetheless, as Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out, it is important to not fully rely on this
graphical evidence since its interpretation often depends the viewers perception and on the
way the graphs have been constructed. Therefore, Table 2 reports two non-parametric balance
tests for all control variables. The results are in line with the graphical evidence and I find that
Education and Gender are statistical significant on the 1%-level. Their coefficients indicate that
around the threshold business-mayors are about two years less educated and the share of female
mayors with business experience is eight percentage points lower than in the non-business group.
24For the regressions, I used a local linear and a local second order-polynomial and the two thresholds c′ = −0.1
and c′′ = 0.1.
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Figure 4: Balance tests: Control variables for mayoral (a-e) municipality (f) and state char-
acteristics (g-h).
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(d) Is the mayor married?
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(e) Was the mayor also born in this municipality?
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(f) Lagged total population
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Figure 4 continues on the next page.
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Figure 4: Balance tests: Control variables for mayoral (a-e) municipality (f) and state char-
acteristics (g-h). (continued)
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The green line is a best fit second-order polynomial in the business-candidate’s margin of victory for
those observations which lie within the optimal bandwidth computed with the Calonico et al. (2014)
method. The polynomial is split by a red dashed line which separates the two groups at the threshold
MVit = 0. Thus, the red points symbolise a business-mayor and the blue ones a non-business-mayor.
The thin grey lines are the 95% confidence interval of the polynomial. Populationit is the population
in the previous year of each period (thus, 2003, 2007 and 2011). See Table A1 for the definition of the
variables.
On the one side, this is reasonable and confirms the assumption that businesspeople differ from
other candidates. However, on the other side, the significant results violate the requirement that
all control variables are locally balanced between the two groups. Given these discontinuities,
the estimation of the causal effect of electing a businessperson might be biased.
In view of this concern, I have three options. First, I can run my regressions assuming that
business-candidates are less educated because of their professional background. In other words,
a business profession requires fewer years of schooling than for example academic professions
and thus, being less educated is a part of the alleged effect of being a businessperson.25 Unfor-
tunately, I cannot assume the same direct causal relationship between being a businessperson
25In the existing literature on RDDs, several authors, such as Becker et al. (2016); Campa et al. (2015); Gagliar-
ducci and Paserman (2016) or Daniele and Vertier (2016), faced similar problems and interpreted the results in
a similar fashion.
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and the candidate’s gender. Nonetheless, I can indirectly suppose that business-professions are
either less appealing to women due to heterogeneous preferences or that there are other obsta-
cles that make it more difficult for women to reach higher management positions or become
entrepreneurs.26 For example, Oakley (2000) explains that among others inadequate career op-
portunities, gender-based stereotypes and ”old boy networks at the top” often prevent women
from reaching upper management positions.27
Second, I could restrict my dataset to a sub-sample in which all covariates evolve smoothly
around the cut-off. I repeated my estimation for ”male” mayors with at most 12 years of
education (completed secondary education) and in doing so, I solved the issue with the two
non-continuous covariates. Nevertheless, analysing the McCrary test for this sub-sample raised
concerns about the randomness of the assignment around the threshold. In contrast to before,
I find a significant positive jump after the cut-off value, which suggests that it is more likely
for the businessperson to get a positive margin of victory. This should come as no surprise, if I
consider that my restriction reduces the sample to 2,413 elections, of which the businessperson
won 1,477 (61.21%). Moreover, a closer look at Figure 2 reveals, that restricting the sample
to a certain educational level will generate imbalances between the treatment and the control
group. Thus, as it is not possible to eliminate the discontinuities in Education and Gender
while keeping a balanced sample, I will not further consider this option.28
Finally, a third way to reduce the observed imbalances around the cut-off would be a matching
procedure as used by Daniele and Vertier (2016). However, I will also leave this option to future
studies and focus my attention on the first option.
4.4 Estimations
In the previous section, I discussed two conditions that must be fulfilled to validate the use of a
regression discontinuity design. Nonetheless, ensuring the estimation of an unbiased treatment
effect also requires a correct specification of the empirical model. Concerning this, the recent
literature on RDDs distinguishes between two approaches: a non-parametric procedure (i.e. a
local linear regression) and a parametric estimation (i.e. a low-order polynomial). Both methods
have their strengths and weaknesses and thus, as Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out, they should
be regarded as complements rather than as substitutes. For one thing, focusing on data points
close to the threshold guaranties a relatively unbiased estimator because control and treatment
group are expected to be very similar in all characteristics except for the treatment status.
Therefore, it is reasonable to estimate a local regression with a bandwidth h that restricts
the sample to elections close to the threshold. However, for another thing, this estimation
26See Van Klaveren et al. (2009) for an overview of women in the Brazilian labour market and the difference of
female participation between sectors.
27Other examples are Langowitz and Minniti (2007) who analyse female entrepreneurship and find evidence for
gender differences in self-perception, Shinnar et al. (2012) who show significant gender differences in perceptions
of barriers to entrepreneurship or Barbulescu and Bidwell (2013) who point out that different preferences, lower
identification with stereotypically masculine jobs as well as lower expectations of job offer success account for
gender differences in applications for managerial jobs.
28Note, that I select 12 years of schooling because the average education in the group of businesspeople is 14 years
and the closest (completed) education is secondary education (after 12 years). However, I also tried a variety
of different sub-samples but in every case, I either came to the same result or ended up with very small sample
sizes.
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Table 2: Baseline results: The impact of electing a businessperson on covariates. RDD esti-
mates.
(a) Mayoral controls (b) Municipality and state controls
Effect Std. Poly. CCT Obs. Effect Std. Poly. CCT Obs.
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age
−0.585 (0.872) 1 0.163 3,234 Popu -
lation
−1, 080.7 (3,293.9) 1 0.142 2,904
−0.908 (1.029) 2 0.230 3,881 −125.29 (4,202.4) 2 0.176 3,332
Edu -
cation
−2.032∗∗∗ (0.357) 1 0.169 3,317
Income
30.792 (23.128) 1 0.160 3,199
−1.985∗∗∗ (0.386) 2 0.303 4,809 43.439 (27.962) 2 0.207 3,688
Gender
−0.078∗∗∗ (0.023) 1 0.159 3,172
GINI
−0.002 (0.003) 1 0.162 3,221
−0.085∗∗∗ (0.027) 2 0.225 3,845 −0.002 (0.003) 2 0.226 3,856
Married
0.037 (0.035) 1 0.147 3,033 Unem -
ployment
−0.043 (0.182) 1 0.163 3,237
0.042 (0.038) 2 0.252 4,028 −0.120 (0.216) 2 0.223 3,836
Origin
0.022 (0.042) 1 0.171 3,334
Av.Study
0.006 (0.069) 1 0.159 3,175
0.027 (0.048) 2 0.259 4,058 0.027 (0.084) 2 0.027 3,690
The table shows the results from two non-parametric regressions. Effect is the treatment effect, Std. is the
standard deviation, Poly. is the order of the polynom, CCT is the bandwidth calculated with the Calonico
et al. (2014) method and Obs. is the number of observations. For a description of all variables, see Table A1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
might suffer from three shortcomings. First, the estimator could be imprecise due to limited
availability of observations close to the threshold. Second, as a local regression might not
correctly approximate the functional form of the running variable f(·) in equation (2) it is
probably not very informative for candidates more distant to the threshold and thus, does not
guarantee external validity. Third, wrong assumptions about the functional form might generate
an ”artificial” small discontinuity at the threshold and thus, lead to false conclusions. For these
reasons, it is useful to also adopt a parametric approach and test for alternative specifications.
In my analysis of the alleged effect of electing a businessperson as mayor, I compare the results
from seven different models.29 I start by following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and adopt both
a local linear (5) and a local polynomial regression (6) without covariates:
Yit = β0 + β1MVit + β2Bit + β3MVitBit + εit (5)
Yit = β0 + β1MVit + β2Bit + β3MVitBit + β4MV
2
it + β5BitMV
2
it + εit (6)
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest for municipality i during legislative period t, Bit
is a dummy that is one when the winner of the election is a businessperson and zero otherwise
and εit is the error term.
30 Please also note, that the inclusion of an interaction terms allows
the function f(·) to be different on each side of the cut-off.
29Usually, regression lines close to the cutoff are close to linear. However, I decided to also adopt a local second-
order polynomial regression because many of the bandwidths that I will use for my estimation in Section 5 are
very large and it might be possible that a polynomial fits the data better.
30Note, that εit includes both the vector of unobservable factors that might ”directly” affect Yit and the stochastic
error term. Using the notation from equation (2), I can express the error term as: εit = Uit + eit.
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As stated above, a local regression restricts the sample to municipalities in the interval MVit ∈
{−h,+h}. The selection of the bandwidth is a key issue for a local analysis as it has to find a
balance between small standard errors and an accurate estimation of the treatment effect. For
this reason, I use a method by Calonico et al. (2014) (in the following referred to as CCT ) to
compute the optimal bandwidth h.31
After that, I repeat the two non-parametric estimations (5) and (6) with mayor, municipality
and state covariates:
Yit = β0 + β1MVit + β2Bit + β3MVitBit + δXit + εit (7)
Yit = β0 + β1MVit + β2Bit + β3MVitBit + β4MV
2
it + β5BitMV
2
it + δXit + εit (8)
where Xit is a vector of covariates.
Additionally, I complement my analysis with a linear, second- and third-order polynomial re-
gression. In general, a model that fits a p-order polynomial on either side of the threshold can
be formalized as follows:
Yit =
p∑
k=0
(αkMV
k
it ) +Bit
p∑
k=0
(βkMV
k
it ) + εit (9)
For the three models I choose p = 1 in the linear case, p = 2 for the second-polynomial and p = 3
for the third-order polynomial model. Note, I cluster the standard errors at the municipality-
level.
Finally, I want to point out that the coefficient of interest in all seven models is the estimator βˆ
that stands in front of the treatment status (Bit) and identifies the ATE around the threshold.
5 Empirical Results
In this chapter I present the empirical results of the regression discontinuity analysis. For my
estimations, I explore the following potential outcome variables that are measured as the average
in each legislative period: the logarithm of total revenue per capita (Revenue), the logarithm
of total expenditure per capita (Expenditure), the logarithm of current transfers (Transfers),
the ratio between revenue and expenditure (REratio), the ratio between total debt and total
assets (DAratio), the sum of sectors that have been subsidized in the last two years (Subsidies,
min 0, max 5), the average number of total active direct administration employees per 1,000
inhabitants (StDirect), the total number of total active indirect administration employees per
1,000 inhabitants (StIndirect) and finally, a dummy variable for broad corruption (Broad).
My empirical analysis basically consists of three main parts. First, I examine the results for
the baseline case, where I aggregated all candidates with a business-related profession. After
that, I also examine the possibility of heterogeneity within the business-group and repeat my
estimation for the sub-sample of entrepreneurs (Empresa´rio) and merchants (Comerciante). In
all three cases, I begin with a graphical analysis and then show formal evidence from the four
31Calonico et al. (2014) use a uniform bandwidth and controls for an order-polynomial of the business-candidates
margin of victory.
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local regressions and three global models as described in Section 4.4.
Note, that I previously observed significant discontinuities for two of my covariates. In light of
this concern I will interpret all of my results using the first of the three mentioned options and
thus, assume a direct causal relationship between being a businessperson and having a lower
educational level. Moreover, I suppose that gender-specific obstacles and different preferences
have a negative effect on women’s labour market participation in the business sector.
5.1 Baseline regression discontinuity results
The main purpose of this paper is to find out whether or not electing a mayor with business
experience has any impact on policy outcomes. I begin by graphically assessing the causal im-
pact of electing a businessperson using scatterplots of the outcome variables. Nonetheless, one
should keep in mind that this graphical presentation of ”raw data” only gives a first glimpse of
whether the jump in the outcome variable around the cut-off is unusually large. Moreover, it is
a first step to identify the correct functional form and visualize why different models may lead
to different results.
Figure 5 plots the binned averages of the nine variables of interest around the cut-off (when
MVit = 0). Most outcome variables evolve smoothly through the threshold, suggesting that
electing a businessperson does not affect any of those variables.32 Further, the graphs include a
best fit second-order polynomial (green line) and a 95% confidence interval. These lines already
give a first impression on the best functional form and also illustrate why a wrong specification
might generate small artificial jumps around the cut-off and thus, lead to a false estimation
of the treatment effect. However, despite different global functional forms, all graphs become
approximately linear or slightly quadratic when approaching the threshold.
Table 3, presents the baseline results for the seven RDD models explained in Section 4.4. The
first two columns report the results of a local linear and a local second-order polynomial regres-
sion without covariates. As previously stated, I only consider observations close to the threshold
using a CCT bandwidth. Additionally, I weight those observations with a triangular kernel,
which gives observations close to the cut-off a higher impact on the estimation. Columns (3)
and (4) repeat the estimation with covariates for mayoral, municipality and state characteristics.
Finally, the last three columns report the results for three parametric models using polynomials
of order 1,2 and 3.
With respect to the interpretation of the results of Table 3, it is important to understand the
information value of the three kinds of models. Note, that a valid RDD provides a locally
randomized experiment and thus, rules out any bias in estimating the treatment effect due to
omitted variables. For this reason, I principally only need to consider the non-parametric models
in the first two columns to conclude whether or not there is any treatment effect. However, I
follow the advice of Lee and Lemieux (2010) and also show non-parametric models with covari-
ates to reduce the sampling variability and increase the precision of my estimation. The purpose
of the last three columns is to repeat the results on a global level to also get information about
candidates more distant from the threshold and further reduce the standard errors.
32The only exception from this is the debt-to-asset ratio (Figure 5e) which seems to have a slightly negative jump
at the cut-off.
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Figure 5: Baseline results: The effect of electing a businessperson. Graphical analysis.
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(c) Current transfers
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Figure 6 continues on the next page.
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Figure 6: Baseline results: The effect of electing a businessperson. Graphical analysis. (con-
tinued)
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The green line is a best fit second-order polynomial in the business-candidate’s margin of victory for
those observations which lie within the optimal bandwidth computed with the Calonico et al. (2014)
method. The polynomial is split by a red dashed line which separates the two groups at the threshold
MVit = 0. Thus, the red points symbolise a business-mayor and the blue ones a non-business-mayor.
The thin grey lines are the 95% confidence interval of the polynomial. See Table A1 for the definition
of the variables.
Overall, the results from Table 3 support my conjecture that there is no unusually large discon-
tinuity around the cut-off for most outcome variables. It is notable that none of the coefficients
from the first two non-parametric models is significant. These results are robust to the inclusion
of covariates in columns (3) and (4) and as anticipated, all standard errors shrink.33 Despite
everything, I do find significant coefficients for an impact on public finance when I use a second-
order polynomial model. In this case, revenue per capita, expenditure per capita and current
transfers per capita are estimated to increase by around 6% each while the debt-to-asset ratio is
expected to decrease by 6.1%. Thus, these results from column (6) propose an effect on public
finance when electing a businessperson. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that this
evidence is very weak because the four results are not robust to different specifications, changes
33Further, I repeated the estimation with additional dummy variables for membership of a left, right or center
political party. However, the significance levels did not change and also the coefficients’ magnitudes and standard
deviations have barely been affected. The information about the candidate’s party (Nome do partido) come
from the IBGE.
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in the bandwidth nor to the inclusion of covariates. Moreover, one should keep in mind that the
parametric models are less likely to identify an accurate treatment effect. Thus, without further
investigation, I cannot conclude that electing a businessperson as mayor has a causal effect on
any of the nine outcome variables.34
In the following I examine three possible reasons for this lack of robustness. First, the band-
widths that I computed with the CCT method have been partially very large and thus, contradict
the basic idea of an RDD. For this reason, Table A5 in the Appendix reports results for both
local regressions using three very small bandwidths: h = 0.1; h = 0.05 and h = 0.02. The results
support my previous findings and indicate that the non-parametric estimations are robust to
different bandwidths.
Second, another possible reason why Revenue, Expenditure, Transfers and DAratio only be-
come significant when I use a second-order polynomial could be a misspecified functional form
that generates an artificial small jump around the threshold and thus, leads to biased results.
Table A6 in the Appendix reports the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for the whole sample.
The results indicate that the best functional form for Revenue, Expenditure and Transfers is a
second-order polynomial, while DAratio should be estimated using a linear model as in column
(3).35 Thus, I can also rule out this possible reason because at least the global functional form
of the first three variables is correctly specified. Unfortunately, a comparison between a local
and a global model using the AIC is not possible as the optimal form strongly depends on the
bandwidth selection.36
Third, it is conceivable that the effect of electing a businessperson depends on the mayor’s exact
profession. Put differently, it might be that aggregating all business-professions to one group
leads to inaccurate results because it ignores the possibility that business-professions might im-
pact policy outcomes with different magnitudes and potentially also in opposed directions. In
light of this concern, I repeat the RDD analysis separately for entrepreneurs (Empresa´rio) and
merchants (Comerciante) in the next section.37
5.2 Regression discontinuity results for entrepreneurs (Empresa´rio) and mer-
chants (Comerciante)
In Section 4.1 I explained that I aggregate candidates from five different business-related pro-
fessions to the baseline business-group. However, I also noted, that this basically sums up Em-
presa´rios and Comerciantes, which together account for 97.3% of all businesspersons. According
34I also considered the possibility that the variable for subsidies to firms might be a bad measure for the effect
of electing a businessperson on subsidies as it only neglects an effect on the total number of subsidized sectors.
Though, it might be that business-mayors only affect the distribution of subsidies between sectors while the total
number subsidized sectors remains unchanged. This would go in line with the assumption that businesspersons
have different preferences and closer ties the business sector. However, as Table A4 shows, this is not the case.
35Note, that the lowest value for the AIC always indicates the best functional form.
36As Lee and Lemieux (2010) explain, one possibility to compare these two kinds of models is by model saturation
with dummies for bins and a test for the null-hypothesis that the corresponding coefficients are equal to zero.
In this test, I would include higher order polynomials until the dummies for bins are jointly insignificant.
37An alternative way to improve the determination of the business-group would be to use the ILO’s International
Standard Classification of Occupations. However, as the information about the candidate’s profession that I get
from the IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica are in a very general manner and unfortunately,
do not contain the ILO occupation codes (ISCO-88, ISCO-08), it would be very difficult to use this classification
scheme for my study.
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Table 3: Baseline results: The impact of electing a businessperson. RDD estimates.
Non-parametric Parametric
Covariates no no yes yes no no no
Polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Revenue 0.034 0.043 0.023 0.021 0.013 0.062∗∗ 0.042
(0.038) (0.048) (0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033)
Bandwidth (h) 0.203 0.238 0.203 0.238 1 1 1
Observations 3,611 3,895 3,554 3,834 4,765 4,765 4,765
Log Expenditure 0.034 0.035 0.025 0.017 0.014 0.061∗∗ 0.041
(0.037) (0.049) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033)
Bandwidth (h) 0.221 0.237 0.221 0.237 1 1 1
Observations 3,777 3,885 3,716 3,823 4,765 4,765 4,765
Log Transfers 0.034 0.043 0.017 0.025 0.008 0.058∗∗ 0.035
(0.040) (0.048) (0.026) (0.034) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033)
Bandwidth (h) 0.192 0.246 0.192 0.246 1 1 1
Observations 3,522 3,943 3,463 3,875 4,765 4,765 4,765
RERatio 0.009 0.018 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.015) (0.020) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
Bandwidth (h) 0.236 0.315 0.236 0.315 1 1 1
Observations 3,879 4,220 3,816 4,151 4,766 4,766 4,766
DAratio −0.059 −0.066 −0.036 −0.062 −0.026 −0.061∗ −0.075
(0.058) (0.062) (0.045) (0.054) (0.026) (0.035) (0.046)
Bandwidth (h) 0.186 0.317 0.186 0.317 1 1 1
Observations 3,456 4,223 3,404 4,154 4,766 4,766 4,766
Subsidies −0.007 −0.012 −0.020 0.030 0.020 −0.000 0.021
(0.109) (0.130) (0.084) (0.106) (0.049) (0.066) (0.084)
Bandwidth (h) 0.163 0.229 0.163 0.229 1 1 1
Observations 1,739 2,080 1,706 2,034 2,586 2,586 2,586
StDirect 0.582 0.487 0.660 −0.109 0.163 1.587 1.425
(1.202) (1.803) (1.109) (1.456) (0.843) (1.002) (1.202)
Bandwidth (h) 0.180 0.233 0.180 0.233 1 1 1
Observations 3,408 3,864 3,354 3,803 4,763 4,763 4,763
StIndirect −0.221 0.257 −0.723 −0.514 −0.305 −0.243 −0.310
(0.507) (0.569) (0.446) (0.545) (0.277) (0.338) (0.396)
Bandwidth (h) 0.151 0.204 0.151 0.204 1 1 1
Observations 755 884 748 886 1,173 1,173 1,173
Broad 0.049 0.148 −0.011 0.133 −0.062 −0.030 0.124
(0.175) (0.235) (0.114) (0.154) (0.057) (0.086) (0.123)
Bandwidth (h) 0.138 0.158 0.138 0.158 1 1 1
Observations 143 156 135 149 222 222 222
The bandwidths are calculated with the CCT method and observations are weighted with a
triangular kernel. For a description of all variables, see table A1. In columns (1) and (2) I used
robust standard errors and in columns (3)-(7) standard errors are clustered standard errors at
the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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to the Portuguese dictionary Ferreira (2009), an Empresa´rio can be defined as businessman or
entrepreneur, while Comerciante corresponds to a merchant, dealer or business owner. Hence,
one can picture an Empresa´rio as ”a man [or woman] who works in business, especially one
who has a high position in a company”, while a Comerciante is someone who trades goods on
a rather small scale.38
In Section 2 I pointed out that businesspersons are assumed to have an advantage due to their
managing experience and their alleged better understanding of economic interrelations. With
regard to the second point, it might be questionable if the group of merchants really fits this
characterization. Even though, they may have strong bargaining skills, owning a business or
shop does not necessarily require any specific formal education.39 Moreover, the daily operations
of a merchant are associated with the purchase and sale of goods rather than with corporate
finance or complex management decisions. For this reason, it is save to assume that the two
groups are quite different and thus, also their effect on policy outcomes might be differing.
In the following, I repeat my baseline estimation for both business-groups separately. First,
I restrict my dataset to 2,557 mayoral elections where the two candidates with the highest
vote-shares were exactly one entrepreneur and one non-businessperson (which now also includes
merchants (Comerciante), business directors (Diretor De Empresas), businessmen and produc-
ers of public events (Empresa´rio E Produtor De Espeta´culos Pu´blicos) and managers (Gerente)).
As in the baseline case, I first check the two main requirements that validate the use of an RDD
to analyse the alleged effect of electing an entrepreneur. Figure A1a in the Appendix visualises
the McCrary test and Table A7 reports balance tests for the control variables. Similar to the
baseline case, the distribution of the running variable (MVit) seems to be continuous and except
for Education and Gender all covariates behave smoothly around the threshold.
As before, I begin with my RD analysis with a graphical representation. Figure A2 in the
Appendix shows scatterplots of the relationship between the outcome variables and the en-
trepreneur’s margin of victory around the threshold. This time, I observe a relatively clear
jump in the total number of active direct administration employees (StDirect) as well as several
little jumps (i.e. in Expenditure, Transfers or DAratio). However, it is not clear whether
these smaller discontinuities are ”real jumps” or only due to a higher degree of variation in the
data-points.40
To investigate this issue, Table 4 reports results from four non-parametric and three parametric
estimations. This time, I observe strong evidence for a discontinuity in the logarithm of total
revenue, total expenditure, current transfers, and the total active direct administration employ-
ees. The results are robust to different bandwidths, different specifications of the functional
form, the inclusion of covariates and a global estimation. Hence, I can conclude that electing an
entrepreneur leads to 7-11% higher total revenue, 8-11% higher total expenditure, 7-13% higher
current transfers and between three and five additional active direct administration employees
per 1,000 inhabitants. However, it is important to keep in mind that I previously ignored the
38This characterization is mainly based on the definition of ”businessman” and ”merchant” from the Cambridge
Dictionary .
39In fact, in my sample, merchants have an average education of 13.48 years, which is 1.03 years shorter than the
average for entrepreneurs.
40Please note, that I excluded the broad measure for corruption (Broad) in this estimation as it would only be
based on at most 49 observations in the two local regressions.
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Table 4: Sub-sample: The impact of electing an entrepreneur. RDD estimates.
Non-parametric Parametric
Covariates no no yes yes no no no
Polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Revenue 0.109∗∗ 0.088 0.070∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.029 0.093∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.055) (0.067) (0.035) (0.045) (0.028) (0.037) (0.046)
Bandwidth (h) 0.186 0.235 0.186 0.235 1 1 1
Observations 1,819 2,052 1,800 2,031 2,526 2,526 2,526
Log Expenditure 0.109∗∗ 0.098 0.086∗∗ 0.083∗ 0.035 0.095∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.053) (0.068) (0.034) (0.045) (0.028) (0.037) (0.046)
Bandwidth (h) 0.214 0.246 0.214 0.246 1 1 1
Observations 1,962 2,097 1,941 2,074 2,526 2,526 2,526
Log Transfers 0.119∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.027 0.086∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.054) (0.064) (0.035) (0.045) (0.028) (0.037) (0.047)
Bandwidth (h) 0.207 0.288 0.207 0.288 1 1 1
Observations 1,921 2,182 1,899 2,159 2,526 2,526 2,526
RERatio −0.006 −0.009 −0.003 −0.005 −0.009∗ −0.003 −0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Bandwidth (h) 0.129 0.185 0.129 0.185 1 1 1
Observations 1,432 1,817 1,413 1,798 2,527 2,527 2,527
DAratio −0.095 −0.100 −0.064 −0.089 −0.026 −0.060 −0.100
(0.104) (0.112) (0.075) (0.091) (0.039) (0.056) (0.077)
Bandwidth (h) 0.191 0.316 0.191 0.316 1 1 1
Observations 1,849 2,233 1,827 2,209 2,527 2,527 2,527
Subsidies 0.076 0.132 0.024 0.067 0.039 0.014 0.057
(0.141) (0.159) (0.108) (0.133) (0.064) (0.087) (0.109)
Bandwidth (h) 0.171 0.252 0.171 0.252 1 1 1
Observations 1,080 1,304 1,062 1,283 1,560 1,560 1,560
StDirect 4.500∗∗ 4.348∗ 3.260∗∗ 3.665∗ 1.311 2.657∗ 4.507∗∗∗
(2.025) (2.423) (1.516) (1.919) (1.144) (1.414) (1.688)
Bandwidth (h) 0.174 0.240 0.174 0.240 1 1 1
Observations 1,752 2,077 1,732 2,054 2,526 2,526 2,526
StIndirect 0.374 0.397 −0.095 0.043 −0.269 0.141 0.254
(0.506) (0.554) (0.434) (0.455) (0.305) (0.365) (0.394)
Bandwidth (h) 0.150 0.254 0.150 0.254 1 1 1
Observations 454 607 453 603 726 726 726
The bandwidths are calculated with the CCT method and observations are weighted with a
triangular kernel. For a description of all variables, see Table A1. In columns (1) and (2) I used
robust standard errors and in columns (3)-(7) standard errors are clustered standard errors at
the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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two negative jumps in the covariates for Education and Gender and thus, the estimated magni-
tudes might not reflect the ”pure” effect of business experience. In fact, as both Education and
Gender are assumed to benefit policy outcomes (see Brollo and Troiano (2016) and Besley and
Coate (1997)), the results should be regarded rather as the lower bound of the ”pure” business-
effect.
Moreover, it is notable, that these findings strongly differ from those in the baseline case sug-
gesting that there might be a heterogeneous treatment effect of electing a businessperson. In
order to provide additional evidence for this presumption, I also repeat the estimation for the
second sub-group. Now, I examine the 2,568 mayoral elections where the two candidates with
the highest vote-shares were exactly one merchant and one non-merchant. Again, I can confirm
the validity of the RDD because first, the McCrary test in Figure A1b in the Appendix does
not show any evidence for a non-random assignment and second, Table A7 indicates that (as
before) Education and Gender are the only discontinuous covariates.
Once more, I start with a graphical analysis of the relationship between the outcome variables
and the running variable. Regarding this, Figure A3 in the Appendix does not give cause to
assume a non-continuous behaviour for any of the eight outcome variables. As before, the best-
fit second-order polynomial suggests some smaller jumps but as there is a wide dispersion in
data-points it is not save to conclude that one of them is a ”real discontinuity”.41
On account of this, it is again advisable to focus on outcomes from a regression analysis. Table
5 presents seven RDD models. The results are robust to different specifications of the func-
tional form, the inclusion of covariates and do not change when using a parametric approach.
Nevertheless, the most notable aspect here is that I do not observe any evidence for an effect
on public finance or public employment when a merchant gets elected. This stands in sharp
contrast to the previous findings from the entrepreneurs-sample and thus, indicates that the
effect of business experience in general is heterogeneous and strongly depends on the legislator’s
exact profession. In view of this, I infer that only those businesspersons who have the ability to
carry out management tasks in bigger organisations are able to impact a municipality’s policy
outcomes.
5.3 Discussion of the results
In this last section, I want to interpret these results in view of the findings from the previous
literature. As pointed out in Section 2, businesspersons are expected to differ from other politi-
cians in two dimensions. First, they are assumed to have a higher ability to lead a government
and improve public finance. In my study, I find that this is only true for the sub-group of
entrepreneurs who are able to attract more transfers from higher levels of the government and
therefore, boost revenues.42 Considering the before mentioned main differences between mer-
chants and entrepreneurs, I conclude that the main reason for this are the advanced negotiating
41Note, that also in this second sub-sample, I dropped Broad due to an insufficient amount of observations.
42Regarding this, it should be stated that the municipalities’ total revenues originates to 92.19% from transfers,
6.43% from tax revenues and to 1.38% from other income sources. Using data from the FINBRA dataset I also
tested whether electing an entrepreneur affects tax revenues (Receita Tributa´ria) per capita but my results did
not suggest a significant effect. The estimated coefficients were again robust to different specifications of the
functional form, the inclusion of covariates and under parametric models.
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Table 5: Sub-sample: The impact of electing a merchant. RDD estimates.
Non-parametric Parametric
Covariates no no yes yes no no no
Polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Revenue −0.030 −0.019 −0.015 −0.015 −0.000 0.028 −0.019
(0.050) (0.062) (0.031) (0.040) (0.029) (0.035) (0.044)
Bandwidth (h) 0.204 0.286 0.204 0.286 1 1 1
Observations 1,935 2,214 1,898 2,172 2,549 2,549 2,549
Log Expenditure −0.036 −0.040 −0.023 −0.018 −0.006 0.023 −0.022
(0.049) (0.058) (0.031) (0.039) (0.029) (0.035) (0.044)
Bandwidth (h) 0.201 0.304 0.201 0.304 1 1 1
Observations 1,926 2,247 1,889 2,204 2,549 2,549 2,549
Log Transfers −0.046 −0.032 −0.024 −0.024 −0.008 0.024 −0.038
(0.050) (0.061) (0.033) (0.042) (0.029) (0.035) (0.044)
Bandwidth (h) 0.192 0.276 0.192 0.276 1 1 1
Observations 1,878 2,188 1,842 2,146 2,549 2,549 2,549
RERatio 0.012 0.038 0.006 0.024 0.014 0.012 0.008
(0.028) (0.042) (0.015) (0.025) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020)
Bandwidth (h) 0.267 0.308 0.267 0.308 1 1 1
Observations 2,166 2,250 2,123 2,207 2,549 2,549 2,549
DAratio −0.058 −0.071 −0.010 0.004 −0.036 −0.063 −0.049
(0.057) (0.066) (0.045) (0.057) (0.035) (0.039) (0.048)
Bandwidth (h) 0.144 0.230 0.144 0.230 1 1 1
Observations 1,588 2,051 1,556 2,012 2,549 2,549 2,549
Subsidies −0.032 −0.156 0.038 0.020 0.015 0.036 0.042
(0.139) (0.180) (0.112) (0.156) (0.068) (0.087) (0.107)
Bandwidth (h) 0.156 0.190 0.156 0.190 1 1 1
Observations 777 877 760 858 1,201 1,201 1,201
StDirect −3.185 −3.434 −2.281 −2.241 −0.943 −0.360 −1.380
(2.206) (2.462) (1.651) (1.918) (1.098) (1.279) (1.599)
Bandwidth (h) 0.142 0.247 0.142 0.247 1 1 1
Observations 1,568 2,098 1,542 2,059 2,547 2,547 2,547
StIndirect −0.564 0.201 −1.031 0.162 −0.096 −0.565 −0.897
(0.716) (0.799) (0.881) (0.947) (0.418) (0.453) (0.629)
Bandwidth (h) 0.132 0.159 0.132 0.159 1 1 1
Observations 326 363 322 360 541 541 541
The bandwidths are calculated with the CCT method and observations are weighted with
a triangular kernel. For a description of all variables, see Table A1. In columns (1) and (2)
I used robust standard errors and in columns (3)-(7) standard errors are clustered standard
errors at the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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and bargaining skills of entrepreneurs. Moreover, it is notable that neither the ratio between
revenue and expenditure nor the debt-to-asset ratio changes. This in turn suggests that en-
trepreneurs dispose of distinctive economic knowledge that helps them to find an effective way
to first raise public revenue and then increase expenditure with a reasonable magnitude and
without accumulating additional debts.
Second, it is assumed that businesspersons have specific preferences and thus, they could be more
willing to support business-related issues. Unfortunately, I do not have information about voting
decisions or concrete policies that the mayors implemented during their legislation. Therefore,
I cannot answer this question confidently. Notwithstanding, I tested whether businesspersons,
entrepreneurs or merchants are more willing to pay subsidies to firms. Regarding this, I did
not find any evidence that would suggest that business-mayors are more receptive to business-
interests. Moreover, also my analysis of broad corruption did not suggest that mayors with a
business-background are more or less willing to take bribes.
6 Conclusion
It is widely believed that personal characteristics, such as age, gender, education or the pro-
fession impact a legislator’s preferences and his/her general ability to govern. Although most
bibliographic characteristics have already been extensively investigated by previous studies, the
effect of professional business-experience has received relatively little attention so far. The pur-
pose of this paper is to contribute to closing this gap and therefore, study whether the election
of a candidate with a background in business has an effect on policy outcomes. The group of
businesspersons is one of the best represented professional groups in policies and it seems to be
a common assumption that businesspersons have a series of beneficial skills, such as negotiation
experience, managing expertise or a higher ability to improve public finance.
In order to test whether these assumptions are true, I examined 4,813 mayoral elections in
Brazilian municipalities in 2004, 2008 and 2012 and studied changes in public finance, public
employment, subsidized firms and corruption. For my baseline analysis, I applied a relatively
broad definition of a businessperson and used a regression discontinuity design to estimate the
average treatment effect of electing a business-mayor. In light of this, I assumed that can-
didates are very similar in sufficiently close races and thus, the selection of the mayor is as
good as random. I provided both a graphical analysis and additional formal evidence from
four non-parametric and three parametric regressions. However, the results turned out to be
mostly insignificant and non-robust. Therefore, I decided to divide the baseline business-group
into the two sub-samples entrepreneurs and merchants, which together account for 97.3% of all
previously defined business-candidates. Repeating the analysis for these two groups generated
robust results, suggesting that the baseline estimation has been biased due to heterogeneity in
the treatment effect.
All in all, I draw three conclusions from my study. First, I do not find any evidence for the
existence of a general effect of business experience and thus, my results oppose the common
assumption that business experience per se matters for a legislator’s ability to govern. Sec-
ond, having specific knowledge related to trade does not impact policy outcomes either. Third,
only the election of a politician who has relevant managing expertise eventually leads to an
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improvement of the municipality’s financial condition. To be more precise, better negotiating
and bargaining skills allow this kind of politicians to attract 7-13% more transfers per capita
from higher government levels, which in turn leads to 7-11% higher total revenues per capita.
As a consequence, the mayor is able to hire more public servants and increase total expenditure
per capita by 8-11% while keeping both the revenue-expenditure-ratio and the debt-to-assets
ratio constant.
Overall, my findings raise a number of additional questions for future research. First, all my
results rely on the assumption that there is a direct relationship between a candidate’s profes-
sion and his/her educational level and gender, albeit the later cannot be regarded as causal.
Although I provided some arguments that support this view, it would be interesting to formally
test this assumption (i.e. with a matching procedure) and thereby examine if my results really
reflect the effect of business experience or if they are mostly driven by educational differences
and potentially a lower share of women.
Second, I do not have any information about the extent of the candidates’ business expertise
and thus, I cannot distinguish between candidates who have a decade-long experience in this
sector and those, who maybe only had a brief insight into the business-world.
Third, and related to the previous point, I do not control for previous political experience. Con-
cerning this, Witko and Friedman (2008) found a high degree of heterogeneity within the group
of businesspeople in their study on Congress members. For example, they show that especially
”members making a direct transition from a business career to the House sponsor more business-
focused legislation”.
Fourth, I assume that entrepreneurs have both a better economic understanding as well as prac-
tical management experience. This assumption should also be investigated as it could be that
some candidates categorized themselves as entrepreneurs although they actually do not match
this characterization. In other words, it would be useful to also gather information about the
focus of the candidates’ education (i.e. specialization in school, subject of university studies,
etc.) and maybe also the exact position(s) in their professional career.
Fifth, it is important to keep in mind that there are significant differences between responsibili-
ties or power of a mayor and those of a senator, minister or president. Therefore, I recommend
future studies to test to what extend my findings change on other government levels.
Finally, it is unclear whether my results would persist in other countries. As The Economist
(2009) pointed out, different countries tend to favour different professions. Due to their historical
background, cultural preferences or stage of development, they seem to like particular qualities
and these qualities are provided disproportionately by only a few professions. Thus, it could be
that the effect might decrease or increase depending on the country’s general perception of a
businessperson.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Overview over all variables.
1. Running Variable
MV Margin of victory (= share of votes that the candidate received minus the vote-
share of the winning candidate).1
2. Mayoral characteristics
Gender Dummy which is 1 if the mayor is female and zero if she is male.2
Age Age of the mayor (in 2005, 2009 or 2013).2
Education Years of education of the mayor: 4.5 (Ensino fundamental (1o grau) incompleto),
9 (Ensino fundamental (1o grau) completo), 10.5 (Ensino me´dio (2o grau) incom-
pleto), 12 (Ensino me´dio (2o grau) completo), 15 (Ensino superior incompleto),
18 (Ensino superior completo), 22 (Po´s-graduac¸a˜o) or empty (na˜o informado).2,4
Married Dummy which is 1 if the mayor is married (casado(a)) and zero otherwise.1
Origin Dummy which is 1 if the mayor is born in the same municipality and zero
otherwise.1
3. Municipality and state characteristics
Population Total population in the previous year in each legislative period (2003, 2007, 2011).3
Income Average household income per capita in each state (in R$).4
Unemployment Unemployment rate in each state.4
GINI Gini coefficient (measure for income-inequality) in each state.4
Av.Study Average years of study (persons 25 years and older) in each state.4
4. Public finance
Revenue Total revenue per capita (in R$).3
Expenditure Total expenditure per capita (in R$).3
Transfers Current transfers per capita (in R$).3
REratio Ratio between revenue and expenditure.3
DAratio Ratio between total debts and total assets.3
5. Subsidies to firms
Subsidies Sum of sectors that have been subsidized in the last two years (0 min, 5 max).2
SubIndustrial Dummy which is equal to 1 if the municipality provided subsidies to firms in the
”Industrial sector” in the last two years.2
SubServices Dummy which is equal to 1 if the municipality provided subsidies to firms in the
”Commercial and Services sector” in the last two years.2
SubTSL Dummy which is equal to 1 if the municipality provided subsidies to firms in the
”Tourism, sport and leisure sector” in the last two years.2
SubAgriculture Dummy which is equal to 1 if the municipality provided subsidies to firms in the
”Agriculture sector” in the last two years.2
SubOthers Dummy which is equal to 1 if the municipality provided subsidies to firms in other
sectors in the last two years.2
Table A1 continues on the next page.
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Table A1: Overview over all variables (continued).
6. Public employment
StDirect Total active direct administration employees per 1,000 inhabitants.2
StIndirect Total active indirect administration employees per 1,000 inhabitants.2
7. Corruption
Broad Dummy which is equal to 1 if at least one (broad) corruption episode is reported.6
8. Identification variables
B Dummy which is equal to 1 if the mayor is a businessperson.1
Business Dummy which is equal to 1 if the candidate is a businessperson.1
Note, that except for the state characteristics, all information refers to municipalities. Further, all
variables referring to ”Municipality and state characteristics”, ”Public finance”, ”Subsidies to firms”,
”Public employment” and ”Corruption” are averaged over each period.
1 Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
2 Source: IBGE : Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica.
3 Source: Tesouro Nacional - Ministe´rio da Fazenda.
4 Source: IPEA: Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada.
5 For the number of years per educational level I used information from Stanek (2013). If the degree was
not completed, I accounted for 50% of the years that are required. For the higher education, I took the
average for a Bachelor and Master degree.
6 Source: Brollo et al. (2013).
spaceeeeeee
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Table A2: Available control and outcome variables per year.
Variables
Period 2004 Period 2008 Period 2012
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
Mayor
Gender - yes - - - yes - - - yes - -
Age - yes - - - yes - - - yes - -
Education - yes - - - yes - - - yes - -
Married yes - - - yes - - - yes - - -
Origin yes - - - yes - - - yes - - -
Municipality and state
Population1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - -
Income yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -
Unemployment yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -
GINI yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -
Av.Study yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -
Public Finance
Revenue yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - -
Expenditure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - -
Transfers yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - -
REratio yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - -
DAratio yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes - - -
Subsidies to firms
Subsidies - - yes - - yes - - - - - yes
Subsidies by sector2 - - yes - - yes - - - - - yes
Public employment
StDirect yes yes yes - yes yes - yes yes yes yes yes
StIndirect yes yes yes - yes yes - yes yes yes yes yes
Corruption
Broad yes - -
1 Note, that I also have information about Population for 2003.
2 The five sectors are: (1) Industrial; (2) commercial services; (3) tourism, sport and leisure, (4)
agriculture and (5) others.
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Table A3: RDD estimates with two placebo thresholds (a) c′ = −0.1 and (b) c′′ = 0.1.
(a) Placebo threshold c′ = −0.1 (b) Placebo threshold c′′ = 0.1
Poly. Bit Std. CCT Obs. Bit Std. CCT Obs.
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Revenue 1 −0.011 (0.044) 0.220 3,437 0.041 (0.049) 0.169 2,830
2 −0.045 (0.058) 0.237 3,611 0.080 (0.060) 0.224 3,434
Log Expenditure 1 −0.024 (0.047) 0.194 3,177 0.034 (0.050) 0.169 2,833
2 −0.049 (0.058) 0.239 3,627 0.065 (0.059) 0.237 3,555
Log Transfers 1 −0.042 (0.049) 0.174 2,945 0.023 (0.047) 0.189 3,086
2 −0.073 (0.061) 0.220 3,432 0.040 (0.054) 0.289 3,946
REratio 1 0.005 (0.008) 0.107 1,898 0.005 (0.008) 0.128 2,241
2 0.005 (0.009) 0.194 3,183 −0.007 (0.016) 0.135 2,362
DAratio 1 −0.048 (0.075) 0.280 3,937 −0.053 (0.056) 0.120 2,120
2 −0.139 (0.125) 0.263 3,811 −0.056 (0.062) 0.222 3,418
Subsidies 1 −0.091 (0.134) 0.142 1,349 −0.092 (0.120) 0.169 1,511
2 −0.076 (0.167) 0.203 1,772 −0.114 (0.151) 0.221 1,828
StDirect 1 0.323 (1.688) 0.182 3,043 0.004 (1.578) 0.177 2,955
2 −0.556 (2.242) 0.200 3,246 1.500 (2.023) 0.195 3,154
StIndirect 1 0.449 (0.694) 0.202 789 1.631∗ (0.961) 0.181 738
2 0.419 (0.898) 0.248 908 1.691∗ (1.003) 0.304 984
Broad 1 0.206 (0.138) 0.135 110 −0.067 (0.131) 0.141 124
2 0.123 (0.217) 0.122 96 −0.071 (0.144) 0.219 171
The table presents the results of two local polynomial regressions without covariates. For my
estimations I calculated the optimal bandwidth with the Calonico et al. (2014) method and where
observations are weighted with a triangular kernel. Poly. is the order of the polynom, Bit is the
treatment effect, Std. is the standard deviation, CCT is the bandwidth calculated with the Calonico
et al. (2014) method and Obs. is the number of observations. For a description of all variables, see
Table A1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Baseline results: RDD results for subsidies to firms in five sectors.
Non-parametric Parametric
Covariates no no yes yes no no no
Polynomial order 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SubIndustrial 0.085 0.093 0.026 0.042 −0.005 0.012 0.029
(0.054) (0.060) (0.041) (0.049) (0.025) (0.031) (0.040)
Bandwidth (h) 0.141 0.233 0.141 0.233 1 1 1
Observations 1,579 2,096 1,543 2,052 2,531 2,531 2,531
SubServices 0.031 0.026 0.041 0.056 0.016 0.003 0.054
(0.057) (0.064) (0.047) (0.057) (0.027) (0.035) (0.045)
Bandwidth (h) 0.158 0.249 0.158 0.249 1 1 1
Observations 1,706 2,142 1,670 2,097 2,586 2,586 2,586
SubTSL −0.017 −0.003 −0.005 −0.008 0.009 0.001 −0.011
(0.040) (0.051) (0.031) (0.043) (0.019) (0.026) (0.033)
Bandwidth (h) 0.191 0.233 0.191 0.233 1 1 1
Observations 1,908 2,094 1,865 2,052 2,586 2,586 2,586
SubAgriculture −0.043 −0.055 −0.025 −0.028 −0.017 −0.012 −0.018
(0.045) (0.053) (0.037) (0.045) (0.020) (0.027) (0.035)
Bandwidth (h) 0.160 0.228 0.160 0.228 1 1 1
Observations 1,721 2,076 1,682 2,032 2,586 2,586 2,586
SubOthers −0.060 −0.059 −0.037 −0.039 0.017 −0.005 −0.032
(0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.039) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032)
Bandwidth (h) 0.139 0.241 0.139 0.241 1 1 1
Observations 1,567 2,124 1,531 2,080 2,586 2,586 2,586
The bandwidths are calculated with the CCT method and observations are weighted with
a triangular kernel. For a description of all variables, see table A1. In columns (1) and (2)
I used robust standard errors and in columns (3)-(7) standard errors are clustered standard
errors at the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Baseline results: RDD results with different bandwidths.
Local linear Local 2nd-order polynomial
Bandwidth (h) h = 0.1 h = 0.05 h = 0.02 h = 0.1 h = 0.05 h = 0.02
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Revenue 0.067 0.006 0.053 0.048 0.020 0.236
(0.064) (0.089) (0.139) (0.083) (0.116) (0.193)
Observations 2,283 1,197 482 2,283 1,197 482
Log Expenditure 0.049 −0.024 −0.024 0.021 −0.03 0.109
(0.065) (0.089) (0.137) (0.083) (0.115) 0.189
Observations 2,283 1,197 482 2,283 1,197 482
Log Transfers 0.070 −0.013 0.033 0.042 −0.019 0.199
(0.064) (0.089) (0.138) (0.083) (0.117) (0.191)
Observations 2,283 1,197 482 2,283 1,197 482
REratio 0.043 0.083 0.212 0.069 0.142 0.326
(0.045) (0.088) (0.214) (0.073) (0.148) (0.315)
Observations 2,283 1,197 482 2,283 1,197 482
DAratio −0.132 −0.105 −0.096 −0.116 −0.063 −0.072
(0.081) (0.087) (0.133) (0.084) (0.137) (0.165)
Observations 2,284 1,198 482 2,284 1,198 482
Subsidies −0.044 −0.046 −0.062 −0.023 −0.126 −0.005
(0.165) (0.239) (0.402) (0.220) (0.323) (0.558)
Observations 1,235 440 265 1,235 440 265
StDirect 1.461 −1.423 1.799 0.506 −2.253 8.635
(2.412) (3.610) (6.787) (3.283) (5.238) (10.094)
Observations 2,283 1,197 482 2,283 1,197 482
StIndirect 0.679 0.286 −1.965∗ 0.750 −0.241 −1.184
(0.646) (0.713) (1.125) (0.719) (0.883) (1.244)
Observations 554 289 118 554 289 118
Broad 0.148 0.273 0.397 0.217 0.092 0.809
(0.270) (0.414) (0.809) (0.385) (0.535) (1.475)
Observations 116 61 25 116 61 25
The table presents results for two non-parametric models without covariates. The
observations are weighted with a triangular kernel. For a description of all variables,
see Table A1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A6: Baseline results: Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Linear
2nd-order
polynomial
3rd-order
polynomial
Best
polynoial
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Revenue 7,093.267 7,085.399 7,088.029 2
Log Expenditure 7,095.281 7,087.318 7,090.107 2
Log Transfers 7,078.124 7,067.493 7,068.668 2
REratio −4, 743.219 −4, 740.462 −4, 736.78 1
DAratio 9,097.597 9,097.707 9,100.753 1
Subsidies 6,922.312 6,925.273 6,929.082 1
StDirect 41,248.94 41,231.88 41,232.72 2
StIndirect 6,301.6 6,305.309 6,308.65 1
Broad 117.6911 120.4543 118.8257 1
The table presents the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for three different para-
metric specifications: linear, second-order polynomial and third-order polynomial
regression. For a description of all variables, see Table A1.
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Table A7: Sub-sample: The impact of electing an entrepreneur and a merchant on covariates.
RDD estimates.
(a) Entrepreneurs (b) Merchants
Poly. Effect Std. CCT Obs. Effect Std. CCT Obs.
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age 1 0.125 (1.224) 0.161 1,694 −1.000 (1.004) 0.169 1,766
2 −0.388 (1.547) 0.197 1,897 −1.125 (1.263) 0.220 2,013
Education 1 −1.454∗∗∗ (0.474) 0.164 1,712 −2.447∗∗∗ (0.415) 0.237 2,083
2 −1.458∗∗∗ (0.505) 0.298 2,227 −2.152∗∗∗ (0.580) 0.233 2,073
Gender 1 −0.063∗∗ (0.027) 0.158 1,675 −0.094∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.166 1,740
2 −0.074∗∗ (0.031) 0.218 2,007 −0.097∗∗ (0.038) 0.237 2,086
Married 1 0.030 (0.048) 0.171 1,763 0.056 (0.045) 0.143 1,591
2 0.030 (0.052) 0.300 2,233 0.059 (0.047) 0.268 2,183
Origin 1 0.008 (0.049) 0.239 2,100 −0.030 (0.056) 0.151 1,637
2 0.102 (0.076) 0.185 1,841 −0.058 (0.073) 0.189 1,873
Population 1 −9032.7 (6266.4) 0.133 1,452 6491∗ 3305.6 0.173 1,747
2 −6067.7 (7167.4) 0.200 1,883 5979.1 3788.3 0.243 2,052
Income 1 32.848 (33.74) 0.167 1,733 16.003 26.547 0.174 1,793
2 28.188 (40.511) 0.226 2,042 37.786 32.227 0.242 2,096
GINI 1 −0.004 (0.003) 0.248 2,134 −0.001 (0.004) 0.159 1,692
2 −0.000 (0.005) 0.221 2,020 −0.002 (0.004) 0.258 2,154
Unemployment 1 0.043 (0.263) 0.159 1,685 −0.001 (0.224) 0.187 1,860
2 0.208 (0.332) 0.192 1,878 −0.542∗ (0.307) 0.174 1,795
Av.Study 1 0.002 (0.093) 0.173 1,769 0.024 (0.088) 0.158 1,691
2 −0.010 (0.116) 0.215 1,994 0.034 (0.099) 0.257 2,152
The table shows the results from two non-parametric regressions. Poly. is the order of the polynom,
Effect is the treatment effect, Std. is the standard deviation, CCT is the bandwidth calculated
with the Calonico et al. (2014) method and Obs. is the number of observations. For a description of
all variables, see Table A1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. space
Figure A1: Sub-sample: McCrary test for entrepreneurs and merchants.
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Figure A2: Sub-sample: The impact of electing an entrepreneur. Graphical analysis.
(a) Total revenue
13
20
18
51
23
82
29
13
34
44
M
ea
n 
of
 To
ta
l r
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 ca
pit
a
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=2052
(b) Total expenditure
13
51
16
84
20
18
23
52
26
85
M
ea
n 
of
 To
ta
l e
xp
en
dit
ur
e 
pe
r c
ap
ita
-.2 0 .2
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=2097
(c) Current transfers
12
96
15
38
17
81
20
24
22
66
M
ea
n 
of
 C
ur
re
nt
 tr
an
sfe
rs
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=2183
(d) Ratio between revenue and expenditure
0.
98
1.
00
1.
01
1.
03
1.
05
M
ea
n 
of
 R
ev
en
ue
-to
-e
xp
en
dit
ur
e 
ra
tio
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=1818
(e) Debt-to-asset ratio
0.
1
0.
3
0.
5
0.
6
0.
8
M
ea
n 
of
 D
eb
t-t
o-
as
se
ts 
ra
tio
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=2233
(f) Sum of subsidized sectors within the last
two years (0 min, 5 max)
1.
3
1.
5
1.
7
1.
9
2.
1
M
ea
n 
of
 S
um
 o
f s
ub
sid
ize
d 
se
cto
rs
 (0
 m
in,
 5
 m
ax
)
-.2 0 .2
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=1304
(g) Total active direct administration spaceeeeeee
employees
35
39
42
46
50
M
ea
n 
of
 To
ta
l a
cti
ve
 d
ire
ct 
ad
m
ini
str
at
ion
 e
m
plo
ye
es
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=2076
(h) Total active indirect administration spa
employees
0.
7
1.
4
2.
2
3.
0
3.
7
M
ea
n 
of
 To
ta
l a
cti
ve
 in
dir
ec
t a
dm
ini
str
at
ion
 e
m
plo
ye
es
-.2 0 .2
Margin by which the entrepreneur won or lost
n=607
The green line is a best fit second-order polynomial in the entrepreneur’s margin of victory for those
observations which lie within the optimal bandwidth computed with the Calonico et al. (2014) method.
The polynomial is split by a red dashed line which separates the two groups at the threshold MVit = 0.
Thus, the red points symbolise a entrepreneur-mayor and the blue ones a non-entrepreneur-mayor. The
thin grey lines are the 95% confidence interval of the polynomial. Note, that I dropped Broad due to
a low number of observations. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables.
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Figure A3: Sub-sample: The impact of electing a merchant. Graphical analysis.
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The green line is a best fit second-order polynomial in the merchant’s margin of victory for those
observations which lie within the optimal bandwidth computed with the Calonico et al. (2014) method.
The polynomial is split by a red dashed line which separates the two groups at the threshold MVit = 0.
Thus, the red points symbolise a merchant-mayor and the blue ones a non-merchant-mayor. The thin
grey lines are the 95% confidence interval of the polynomial. Note, that I dropped Broad due to a low
number of observations. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables.
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